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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay evaluates the new road Giovanni Arrighi paves in Adam Smith in Beijing (2007) in 
relation to the scholarly debate on Europe's Great Divergence and the remarkable resurgence of 
East Asia in the global economy at the end of the twentieth century. At the center of Adam Smith 
in Beijing is the argument that the probability has increased that we are witnessing the formation 
of an “East Asian-centered world-market society,” rivaling the historical “capitalist world-
economy”. We show how Arrighi’s discovery of East Asia has led him to supplement the analysis 
of historical capitalism he presented in The Long Twentieth Century (1994). This brings about 
uncertainties and problems. On the one hand, Arrighi is clear in his view on the different paths of 
economic development followed by the Europe-centered capitalist world-system, and the 
Chinese-centered market-oriented world-system. These paths remained largely separate until 
deep into the nineteenth century. On the other hand, Arrighi is less clear on how the Asian 
market-oriented legacy survived its incorporation into a globalizing capitalist world-economy, a 
crucial precondition for Arrighi’s political message. Characterized as a process of 
subordination, hybridization, or fusion, it remains difficult to extract from Arrighi an 
unambiguous understanding of the place of China and East Asia within the capitalist world-
system. It is just as hard to understand the nature of that “interstitial” system itself. These 
conceptual and theoretical uncertainties suggest a central question and problem that hangs over 
Adam Smith in Beijing: What remains of the capitalist world-system as an analytical category 
that allows us to understand economic history and our possible futures? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we focus on the “Asian turn” that Arrighi has taken on his long march to historical 
sociology, a turn that became visible with The Long Twentieth Century (1994) and which came 
full circle in Adam Smith in Beijing.1
                                                 
1 For an evaluation of the long march to historical sociology see Arrighi 2009.  
 At the center of Arrighi’s Asian turn is the debate over what 
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Pomeranz (2000) calls the “Great Divergence” between the economic growth trajectory of the 
industrializing economies (often labeled as the West) and The Rest since 1800, a divergence that 
started “big time” after 1870 (Pritchett 1997). This divergence broke through after England and 
other national economies made the transition from an organic to a mineral-based fossil-fuel 
economy and unbounded the Prometheus of technology-based and capital-intensive persistent 
economic growth (Landes 1969; Wrigley 1988). The mechanization of production not only 
loosened the Malthusian constraints that typified pre-industrial societies, it also pushed the 
productive and military strength of the early European industrializers to unprecedented heights, 
resulting in their worldwide economic and geopolitical dominance by 1900. Around that time, 
Max Weber wondered “to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in 
Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which 
(as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.” (Weber 
2003:13). Since Weber, a lot has been written on the combination of circumstances that lay 
behind “The Rise of the West” (McNeill 1992) or the “European Miracle” (Jones 1981; also see 
Van Zanden 2008). Nevertheless, opinions differ greatly on whether Europe’s development of 
large-scale mechanized industry was primarily a homegrown achievement or the result of its 
position within the networks of commerce and empire that have gradually circumscribed the 
world (for a review see Vries 2009).  
For a long time this historical problem suffered from a classic case of Eurocentrism. 
Whether one searched the origins to the industrial take-off primarily internal to Western-
European societies, as did Weber or Marx, or found them in the imperial space that Great Britain 
commanded, as did Eric Williams (1944), it is clear that lot of studies hardly went beyond the 
European experience. The problem with this approach is that it left many hypotheses regarding 
the technological, institutional, social, political or geographical conditions within Great-Britain, 
Europe or the West unchecked, lacking a comparative framework that could help to identify 
which conditions were in retrospect necessary or sufficient to set a handful of European 
economies on the road to industrialization and global domination. Fernand Braudel admitted to 
this blind spot in his magnum opus Civilization and Capitalism (1981, 1982, 1984). Braudel 
lamented the “historiographical inequality” between Europe and the rest of the world, with a 
European history that was well-lit versus the history of “non-Europe” that was still to be written: 
 
And until the balance of knowledge and interpretation has been restored, the 
historian will be reluctant to cut the Gordian knot of world-history – that is the 
origin of the superiority of Europe. […] One thing seems clear to me: the gap 
between the West and the other continents appeared late in time […]. By 
mechanizing, European industry became capable of out-competing the traditional 
industry of other nations. The gap which then opened up could only grow wider 
as time went on. The history of the world between about 1400 and 1850-1950 is 
one of an ancient parity collapsing […]. Compared with this predominant trend, 
everything else is secondary (Braudel 1982:134; 1984:535). 
 
For many world-systems analysts, the question of industrialization and the subsequent, yet 
relatively late, “collapsing of an ancient parity” is – almost by definition – endogenous to the 
long-term operations of an expanding capitalist world-system. As a consequence, industrialization 
tends to receive short shrift when explaining the major transformations in global economic 
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history. In the third volume of The Modern World-System, Wallerstein reduces eighteenth century 
British industrialization from one of those “traditional lodestars by which to navigate the misty 
and turbulent waters of modern historical reality” to a mere footnote in the consolidation and 
entrenchment of the capitalist world-system (Wallerstein 1989:256). Much like Wallerstein, 
Arrighi is influenced by John Nef (1934) and claims that there have been different moments of 
industrial expansion in England (in the fourteenth, sixteenth/early seventeenth, and late 
eighteenth centuries), all integral to an ongoing expansion, restructuring, and reorganization, of a 
European capitalist world-economy, in which England was incorporated from the very start 
(Arrighi 1994:209; Wallerstein 1984:33). Andre Gunder Frank adds to this scheme that the first 
industrial expansion “improved England’s competitive position only relative to Flanders, and the 
second only relative to northern and southern Europe. The third adjustment finally managed 
significantly to alter Britain’s competitive position worldwide.” (Frank 1998:290) 
Recent research adds new support to the thesis that the emergence of industrialization in 
Britain should indeed be understood in the context of Britain’s accumulated advantages in an 
expanding commercial and imperial system, creating a high wage economy in which there was 
systematic incentive to invent and implement technologies that substituted capital and coal for 
labor (see Allen 2009; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007; Flynn & Giráldez 2004, 2008; Pomeranz 
2000; Sugihara 2003; but compare to Goldstone 2009; Vries 2005, 2008). In doing so, many 
scholars have looked across Eurasia in order to compare the European developmental trajectory 
with East Asia’s (see Little 2008). Two explanations account for the popularity of these 
comparisons. First, regarding the historical debate on the Great Divergence, the scientific and 
economic development of China in the centuries prior to the divergence makes it all the more 
puzzling why industrialization and the subsequent rise to global power did not happen East but 
West. Second, the vitality of Euro-American/Western hegemony today seems less secure than 
ever before. The economic “miracles” of Japan, the Asian tigers, and most recently China, beg 
the question if we are witnessing “The Rise of East Asia” and to what extent this “Rise” also 
implies the “Descent of the West” (Ferguson 2006:596-646)? Or does it point to a “Great 
Convergence”, a catch-up process in economic and political development between the two sides 
of the Eurasian landmass, and perhaps between The West and The Rest (Sachs 2008:24)?2
In Adam Smith in Beijing, Arrighi takes this scholarship on board to analyze the global 
origins and consequences of the Great Divergence from the theory of historical capitalism 
  
                                                 
2 The idea of an economic “Rise of The East” or a “Great Convergence” can be evaluated in different ways. 
Andrew Glyn (2005) notes that China doubled its ratio of per capita GDP compared to the USA over the 
past 20 years. This accounts for all the reduction in the inequality of the distribution of income on a world 
scale, and makes up for all the collapsed output share of the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and much 
of the downward drift in the share of Europe and Japan. Meanwhile, Glyn finds that China’s per capita 
GDP is still as far behind the USA as Korea and Taiwan were before their three decades of rapid catch-up 
beginning in the late 1960s. The fundamental point to Glyn therefore is the surge in the combined growth 
of China, India and other developing countries and the fact that since the mid 1990s the majority of world 
GDP growth has been produced outside the founding OECD countries. The fundamental point for Arrighi 
could be said to be the key role that China fulfils in this combined surge as an increasingly significant 
importer of commodities and resources from developing countries, creating thus an alternative market for 
their products outside the OECD. In both cases, the central point of debate is of course if this relative rise in 
productivity and market should be interpreted as the first signs of an emerging, Asian or Sino-centered, 
global economy. 
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presented in The Long Twentieth Century. Arrighi wants to construct a model of the Great 
Divergence that tells us something, not just about its origins, but also about its development over 
time, its limits, and its prospects. He goes beyond the history of the widening gap between the 
European industrializers and The Rest. For Arrighi “the really interesting question is […] how 
and why China has managed to regain so much ground, so quickly after more than a century of 
political-economic eclipse” (Arrighi 2007a:32). Arrighi sees an increasingly likelihood that 
because of the Chinese resurgence we are witnessing the formation of an “East Asian-centered 
world-market society,” rivaling the historical “capitalist world-economy.” The central political 
message is that this change in the nature of the now-global world-economy might bring about a 
Great Convergence, bringing the different regions of the world closer together into the sort of 
Commonwealth of Civilizations that Adam Smith dreamt of.  
Both propositions are far from self-evident and Adam Smith is a sophisticated attempt to 
substantiate both claims. With good reason, many reviewers have questioned Arrighi’s 
characterization of present-day China as a non-capitalist society that can help to bring about this 
Commonwealth of Civilizations (Abbeloos 2008; Clark 2008; Coyne 2009; Dyer 2007; Gulick 
2009; Trichur and Sherman 2009; Walden 2007).  This essay primarily focuses on the analytical 
side of the story, on Arrighi’s model for the Great Divergence and Convergence. What we want 
to underline is how much Arrighi has modified the original idea of China’s “subordination to the 
Western commands” that was presented in The Long Twentieth Century. Instead, he has come to 
favor “hybridization” between two distinct paths of developments, one capitalist and one not. 
And within this hybrid construct he stresses the resilience of the market-logic that prevailed in 
China in particular (despite the active distortion of market forces up until 1979 and the active 
promotion of profit-seeking after 1979). In other words, Arrighi’s hope for an East Asian-
centered world-market society motivates a renewed understanding of The Long Twentieth 
Century. His additions and revisions nevertheless can be questioned, and bring new uncertainties 
and problems with regards to the scale and scope of world-systems research and its analytical 
concepts. On the one hand, Arrighi is clear that two distinct world-economies, one capitalist and 
one not, evolved on the East and West of the Eurasian landmass deep into the nineteenth century. 
On the other hand, he is less clear on what happened afterwards, once the two world-economies 
came into contact and The Great Divergence ran its course. Characterized as a process of 
subordination, hybridization, or formal dissolution, it remains hard to get an unambiguous 
understanding of the place of China and East Asia vis-à-vis the Euro-American networks of 
power and the expanding markets for capital, goods and services. Equally, it is unclear how 
Arrighi understands the functioning of these networks of power and markets, of this “interstitial” 
capitalist system. He sees a world in singular, denoted as “world capitalism”, “world market” or 
“world-trading system” and there are worlds in plural that bear their own dynamic, such as the 
Global North and Global South. These conceptual uncertainties concerning the juxtaposition and 
permutation of two world-economies, one capitalist and one not, hinder Arrighi’s attempts to cut 
the Gordian knot of the Great Divergence and Convergence.  
 
 
FROM THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY TO ADAM SMITH IN BEIJING 
 
As Thomas Reifer notes (2009:250), Adam Smith can be read as the third instalment of Arrighi’s 
“unplanned trilogy”, along with Chaos & Governance in the Modern World System (1999) and 
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The Long Twentieth Century (1994). In The Long Twentieth Century Arrighi analyzes the 
changing relationships between the controllers of mobile capital and state power through the 
evolution of a capitalist world-economy that emerged some 700 years ago in Europe. According 
to Arrighi, this world-economy developed through successive systemic cycles of accumulation. 
Arrighi reconstructs the Genoese, Dutch, British, and American cycles of accumulation and 
discusses the successive forms of political exchange and the geographies they implied. Each cycle 
consists of a phase of material expansion, followed by one of financial expansion. During the first 
phase, the alliance between the governmental and capitalist agencies is based on the superior 
ability of the leading governmental agency to create a profitable investment regime which attracts 
capital from across its borders. During the phase of financial expansion, the hegemon looses this 
ability and gets overtaken by another organizational revolution, sustained by yet another 
governmental agency. However, before a new round of creative destruction takes place, the “old” 
capitalists still enjoy their phase of financial expansion. Capital pulls out of the productive, real 
sphere of the economy, and starts a temporary profitable retreat in the financial sphere, as has 
been visible during the Florentine Renaissance, the Dutch periwig period of the eighteenth 
century, the Edwardian Belle Epoque at the end of the nineteenth century and the globalizing 
nineties. All these episodes proved to be brief, only temporarily masking the underlying crisis in 
the spheres of production and trade which had in fact motivated the financialization of the 
economy. Out of such a period of systemic chaos a new regime of accumulation finally emerges 
and establishes the conditions for another cycle of accumulation (also see Arrighi 1999a). 
Important to note is that these cycles are cut through by a very important structural transformation 
of the capitalist world economy. From the United Provinces to the United States, from the 
merchant communities to the multinational corporations, Arrighi sees the recurrent emergence of 
new leading complexes of governmental and business agencies, more powerful, both militarily 
and financially, than the complexes they replace (1994:58,217). This evolution is accompanied by 
a greater specialization in the functions of state and business organizations. Arrighi in casu 
notices a transformation from a system in which networks of accumulation were embedded in and 
subordinate to networks of power into a system in which networks of power are embedded in and 
subordinate to networks of accumulation (1994:86).  
Arrighi underlines that The Long Twentieth Century “lumps” together the insights of 
many intellectuals, amongst others Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Henri Pirenne, Max Weber, Joseph 
Schumpeter and Charles Tilly. But the book is especially indebeted to Braudel’s account of early 
modern European history in Capitalism and Civilization (1981, 1982, 1984). Arrighi builds his 
analysis on three Braudelian principles that have shaped much of the world-systems paradigm. 
First is Braudel’s idea of a world-economy (économie-monde, Weltwirschaft), which “concerns a 
fragment of the world, an economically autonomous section of the planet able to provide for most 
of its own needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic unity” 
(Braudel 1984:22). Second is Braudel’s insistence on the longue durée as the best temporal 
framework to analyze structural changes (1958). Third, and most important, is Braudel’s 
understanding of capitalism. Braudel agreed “with the Marx who wrote […] that European 
capitalism […] began in thirteenth-century Italy” (Braudel 1984:57). By this, Braudel means that 
the Industrial Revolution might have changed the face of the earth, but it did not introduce the 
world to capitalism. As a consequence, Braudel renounces the reification of capitalism as a 
certain phase in economic history, triggered by the advent of industrialization. Instead, he regards 
capitalism to be the antonym of market competition. It is the wielding of monopoly power, the 
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blocking out of market forces in favor of power relations, the establishment of non-markets or 
better, anti-markets. In that sense, economic activities that are multinational and highly skillful 
such as long distance trade, foreign exchange and credit arrangements for a long time in world 
history created much better opportunities vis-à-vis the sphere of production to achieve some sort 
of monopoly power. Braudel thus offers a critique, or assault as Wallerstein calls it, against the 
conflation by classical economists of the market and capitalism (Wallerstein 1991, 2004:18; also 
see Arrighi 2007b:266-267). But his understanding of capitalism also diverts from the Marxist 
necessity to reduce the concept of capitalism to a defined mode of production, next to other 
modes such as slavery or feudalism (Brenner 1977; Laclau 1971). What Braudel highlighted, and 
much of world-systems analysis builds upon, is that capitalism should not be seen as a certain 
mode of production but as certain mode of rule and accumulation that can, but needs not to, be 
based on wage labor.   
Combining these three guiding principles, Arrighi restructured Braudel’s panoramic view 
of European history into a series of systemic cycles of accumulation.3
 
 In this recasting of 
Braudel’s perspective, Arrighi however elides one of Braudel’s most important contributions. For 
Braudel, capitalism, since it is little more than the manipulation of market forces towards 
monopoly power, was never a unique European phenomenon. Long distance trade for Braudel 
“lay at the heart of the most advanced capitalism in the Far East”, although he admits that outside 
of Europe, “the merchants and bankers never had the stage to themselves”, especially in “the 
aberrant case of China” where the imperial administration blocked any attempts at sustained 
capital accumulation (Braudel 1982:125, 136-137; 1984:520). In The Long Twentieth Century 
Arrighi, much more than Braudel, shows how in Europe the merchants and bankers also shared 
the stage of capital accumulation with the territorial and political aspirations of city-states and an 
emerging inter-state system. But in the end, this relationship between capital and power did create 
a European capitalist world-economy in Arrighi’s view. Only through the consolidation and 
globalization of this European capitalist world-economy regions outside of Europe come into the 
picture, discussing their integration and subordination to a “capitalist” system”. In this respect, 
Arrighi’s discussion of historical capitalism mirrors Wallerstein’s reconstruction of a modern 
capitalist world-system that globalized out of Europe since the sixteenth century (recapitulated by 
Wallerstein 1993). In both cases capitalism as a rule of accumulation is a priori considered to be 
a European characteristic. Furthermore, this quality is seen as the cornerstone of a social system. 
Both propositions radicalize Braudel’s understanding of a European capitalist world-economy that 
is dependent on the economic spheres of market society and material life but does not dictate 
them. In the words of Braudel, we need to “think again before assuming that our societies are 
organized from top to bottom in a ‘capitalist system’” (Braudel 1984:630; also see Braudel 
1982:239). As we will see now, this a priori equation between capitalism and a European, 
globalizing, system in The Long Twentieth Century creates the problems Adam Smith needs to 
resolve. 
                                                 
3 Or as he said to Harvey: “Braudel is an incredibly rich source of information about markets and 
capitalism, but he has no theoretical framework. […] You can’t simply rely on Braudel; you have to 
approach him with a clear idea of what you are looking for, and what you are extracting from him” (Arrighi 
2009: 71). 
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Can Capitalism Survive Success? 
 
In the epilogue of The Long Twentieth Century, Arrighi poses the same question that Braudel and 
Schumpeter (1976) have asked before him: “Can capitalism survive success?” To Braudel this 
was a rhetorical question since he did “not have the impression that capitalism is likely to 
collapse of its own accord, in some form of ‘endogenous’ deterioration; for any collapse to take 
place, there would have to be some external impact of great violence; and a credible alternative 
would have to be available.” (Braudel 1984:626) Both Wallerstein and Arrighi diverge from 
Braudel on this point. Wallerstein emphasizes how a set of secular trends gradually contradicts 
the possibilities for accumulation within the capitalist system: on the one hand rising costs of 
production and on the other hand sales prices that do not keep pace due to increased competition - 
no matter how successful the constant attempts to keep competition at bay (Wallerstein 2004:83). 
He believes these secular trends already began to reach their limit some forty years ago and that 
the capitalist world-system has entered an “age of transition”. For Wallerstein, the outcome of 
this crisis is uncertain, stressing the ability and necessity of social forces to stimulate the creation 
of a more egalitarian system of political economy for the future (Wallerstein 2005:1272-1277).  
Arrighi focuses on the systemic expansion of the networks of power and accumulation 
during the cycles of accumulation we discussed above. Extrapolating this secular trend, Arrighi 
constructs three scenarios that all mark “the end of capitalism as we have known it.” In the first 
scenario, the extent of the state- and war-making capabilities of the United States and its 
European allies creates the first true global empire, pacifying interstate relations by appropriating 
the surplus accumulation worldwide through force, cunning or persuasion. This would terminate 
capitalist history by terminating inter-state competition, a central drive behind the capitalist 
world-system. The second option sees the world slipping into a sort of systemic chaos out of 
which capitalism had emerged some seven centuries ago, again signaling the end of capitalism as 
a system. In the third scenario capitalist history would come to an end through the re-centering of 
the world-economy in East-Asia:  
 
East Asian capital may come to occupy a commanding position in systemic 
processes of capital accumulation. […] capitalist history […] would come to an 
end as a result of the unintended consequences of processes of world market 
formation. Capitalism (the “anti-market”) would wither away with the state 
power that has made its fortunes in the modern era, and the underlying layer of 
the market economy would revert to some kind of anarchic order (Arrighi 
1994:355-356). 
 
The main argument of Adam Smith in Beijing is that the third scenario has become increasingly 
likely: an “East Asian-centered world-market society” is going to replace the present day 
“capitalist world-economy” (Arrighi 2007a:7). This change in the nature of the world-economy 
according to Arrighi is triggered by the United States’ failed Project for a New American Century 
(undermining its hegemonic status), and the continuing shift in the epicenter of the global 
political economy to East Asia. Contrary to The Long Twentieth Century, however, East Asia no 
longer points to the capitalist archipelago of Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Singapore. Instead, China has moved to center stage. Given the fact that China was barely 
touched upon in The Long Twentieth Century, Arrighi thus has to “fit” the Chinese ascent into his 
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analysis of the development of the world-system. Furthermore, he has to demonstrate how this 
ascent has the potential to steer the very nature of the global economy away from capitalism, and 
toward a market society. These points were raised most poignantly by his long-time friend Andre 
Gunder Frank who believed that the resurgence of East Asia caught Arrighi in “an irresolvable 
contradiction”:  
 
First he claims capitalism began in the Italian cities and from there went through 
successive cycles of financial revolution […]. At the same time and more so 
since, Giovanni has discovered China and its central place in world economic 
development although of course it had little or no part in the institutional 
development of capitalism based in Europe. The only resolution of Giovanni's 
knot, I argue, is to cut the Gordian knot of capitalism all together (Frank 
2005:s.p.) 
 
In Frank’s view, Arrighi’s original neglect to put China into the world-historical equation was a 
direct consequence of his Eurocentric understanding of historical capitalism. According to Frank, 
Arrighi and Wallerstein unwisely reduced capitalist history to the expansionist transformation of 
the Eurpean world-economy during the last five or seven centuries, whereas he wanted to stress 
the existence and relevance of a world system that centered on Asia long before the nineteenth 
century and might re-center on Asia in the near future (Frank 1998; Frank and Gills 1993). 
Wallerstein and Arrighi had serious problems with Frank’s attempt to slay the Eurocentric demon 
and pull the rug out from under the feet of Western social theory (Wallerstein 1999, Arrighi 
1999b). Arrighi criticized Frank for negating “the undeniable specificity of the modern era, as 
defined by the extraordinary expansionary thrust of the Euro-centric system both absolutely and 
relative to the Sinocentric system” (Arrighi 1996:6). But this implies of course that Arrighi needs 
to contrast the differences between this “Euro-centric” capitalist system and the “Sinocentric” 
system, and deal with their presumed convergence at present.  
 
 
REVISITING THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
Arrighi attempts to solve Frank’s “irresolvable contradiction” not by abandoning the theory of 
historical capitalism, but by elaborating the systemic cycles of accumulation perspective 
articulated in The Long Twentieth Century. On the one hand, Adam Smith puts stronger emphasis 
on the characterization of the emerging European world-economy after about 1300 as capitalist, 
in contrast to an East-Asian non-capitalist but market-based world-economy. On the other hand, 
the East-Asian world-economy is not considered to be subordinated to a globalizing, originally 
European, capitalist world-economy once the European gunpowder empires gradually unlocked 
China during the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the convergence of the European and East-
Asian “paths of development”, in Arrighi’s view, creates the opportunity for an emerging non-
capitalist, Sino-centered commonwealth of civilizations. We concur that the first supplement 
convincingly confirms the architecture of The Long Twentieth Century. The second revision 
however is much more problematic as Arrighi assumes but never accounts for the survival of a 
seeming Asian market-oriented legacy into a European, and later on North-American, political-
military interaction network.  
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Let us start with the first supplement. The contrast between a European capitalist world-
economy and an East-Asian market-based society immediately brings us back to Braudel’s 
distinction between market competition and its capitalist antithesis. Arrighi paints the East-West 
regional contrast by recalling Adam Smith’s distinction between a “natural” and an “unnatural,” 
or retrograde, path of economic development. On the natural path, the greater part of capital is 
directed first to agriculture, next to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. On the 
unnatural path, the vector of economic development is inverted, as foreign commerce demands 
finer manufactures that are fit for trade, while manufactures and foreign commerce together give 
birth to the principal improvements in agriculture. Smith believed the modern states of Europe 
walked down the unnatural path: 
But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some degree in 
every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been, in many 
respects, entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their cities has 
introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for distant sale; and 
manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the principal 
improvements of agriculture. The manners and customs which the nature of their 
original government introduced, and which remained after that government was 
greatly altered, necessarily forced them into this unnatural and retrograde
Arrighi agrees with Smith that Chinese economic development fits the natural path until the 
nineteenth century. Following the Opium Wars (1839-1860), China was opened up to foreign 
trade under European pressure. This meant that China was confronted with Smith’s identified 
unnatural order of things. Ideal typical as these classifications are, and despite the fact that they 
make long-distance trade the mother of all inventions in Europe, Arrighi accepts the distinction. 
Although he admits that trade was important to both European and East-Asian states, he stresses 
that the economic and political weight of long-distance trade relative to short-distance trade was 
far greater in the European than in the East Asian system (Arrighi 2007a:319). He recalls how 
this long-distance, East-West trade was vital to the fortunes of Venice, instigated the “discovery” 
of America, and created unseen opportunities for the Dutch and British merchants and chartered 
companies. In contrast, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) instigated a policy that privileged the 
domestic market over foreign trade, a policy that was relaxed now and then, but resumed with the 
consolidation of Qing rule in 1644. In short, the East Asian system was not directed towards 
geographical expansion but towards state- and national economy-making. The most frequent acts 
of war were aimed at safeguarding China’s northern border, not at the extension of this border. In 
sharp contrast to the extraversion and expansionist tendencies of the modern European States, the 
East-Asian State components did not build overseas empires in competition with one another or 
engaged in an armament race in any way comparable to the European states (Arrighi 2007a:313-
316).
 order 
(Smith 1991:340). 
4
                                                 
4 In contrast to Wallerstein, the differences between the East Asian and European system are not painted in 
terms of a European inter-state system versus a East-Asian world-empire, in which China would act as the 
imperial centre and concentrates political, economic and cultural power (see Wallerstein 1974:63). As 
Arrighi points out, Great Britain fulfilled a similar role in the European system during the nineteenth 
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Arrighi does not deny the presence of profit-seeking agencies in China. However, in line 
with Braudel (1984), Bin Wong (1997) and Pomeranz (2000), Arrighi postulates that these 
capitalists were never able to promote their search for the accumulation of capital as the 
cornerstone of national economic development, which was instead aimed at feeding and 
protecting the empire. This East Asian path blocked the synergy between militarism, capitalism, 
industrialization and territorial expansion which characterized European development.  This path 
also made East Asia and China no match for the European states when they forced the opening of 
China in the south, where the equivalent of a Chinese wall was missing. 
This juxtaposition between a European and East-Asian world-economy not only 
confirms the narrative of The Long Twentieth Century on the creation of a European capitalist 
world-economy, it also allows Arrighi to reconsider the interaction between the two systems. 
Whereas the longstanding trade between Eastern and Western Eurasia influenced Frank to 
postulate the existence of a 5000 year old world system, Arrighi reconstructs two different world-
economies that rested upon different institutional settings through which this trade took place. 
East-West trade fitted the capitalist rationale that buttressed the European world-economy, but 
remained of minor importance to the political economy that ruled the East-Asian inter-state 
system. This is why long-distance trade may have brought the most advanced capitalism to the 
shores of the Far East, but never encompassed Eastern society to the extent it did on the Far West 
of the Eurasian landmass (Braudel 1982:124). What Frank presents as an irresolvable 
contradiction between China’s central place in global economic development and Arrighi’s model 
of the institutional development of capitalism based in Europe, is solved by reaffirming the 
different political economy structure in Europe and East-Asia. Profit-seeking stimulated 
European agencies to step outside of the European world-economy but when they did they 
penetrated another world-economy, they did not act within one Eurasian world system. The 
difference on this point between Frank and Arrighi is quite clear (Denmark 2009:236).   
  
Beyond the Great Divergence 
 
Up to this point, Arrighi faced few problems in comparing the East Asian trajectory with the 
European one. The real challenge, as expected, starts once China and East Asia are “subordinated 
to Western commands”, to quote one of the few passages in The Long Twentieth Century on 
China (Arrighi 1994:48). If China in particular, and East Asia in general, walked down a radically 
different developmental path than Europe, what happens when these paths converge? Does the 
market logic of the East dissolve within a capitalist world-economy that has become “all powerful 
and truly global” (Arrighi 1994:11)? In our view, Arrighi has altered this proposition in different 
ways and on different occasions since The Long Twentieth Century. In 1996 he replies to Gunder 
Frank that “capitalism as a mode of rule and accumulation did become dominant, first in Europe 
and then globally.” But he adds that capitalism “never completely lost its interstitial character, 
which is as evident in today's emerging center of world capitalism (East Asia) as in its original 
sixteenth-century center (Western Europe)” (Arrighi 1996: 27-28). The key word here is the 
rather confusing “interstitial character” of capitalism. What Arrighi refers to is the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                 
century. And although this brought about Europe’s remarkable Hundred Years Peace (1815-1914), the 
interstate competition was continued at the outer rims of the by then globalizing European system, as 
European states scrambled for Africa and knocked down the walls of Imperial China. 
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capitalism as a rule of accumulation in Europe predates the rise of the modern states and is thus 
perfectly able to survive in many different political economic configurations, such as city-states, 
quasi-empires, and business diasporas. The question then is of course how a shift of the economic 
center to the East would entail “the end of capitalism as we knew it”, given the fact that 
capitalism always had an “interstitial character” and as mode of rule and accumulation has 
become dominant? 
Three years later, in Chaos and Governance in the Modern World-System, Arrighi, 
Ahmad and Shih (1999:248-49) underscore the “formal dissolution” of the China-centered world-
system under European expansion. But they add that despite the formal dissolution of the 
structures and norms of the East Asian system, these structures nevertheless persisted, and 
“continued to shape and influence interstate relations within East Asia”. Despite the incorporation 
of East Asia into the global circuits of power, Arrighi and Silver maintain that Western intrusion 
destabilized and transformed a China-centered world system, “but never managed to destroy and 
create it in the Western image”: 
 
All the region’s most important nations that were formally incorporated in the 
expanded Westphalia system – from Japan, Korea, and China, to Vietnam, Laos, 
Kampuchea, and Thailand – had all been nations long before the European 
arrival. What’s more, they had all been nations linked to one another, directly or 
through the Chinese center, by diplomatic and trade relations and held together 
by a shared understanding of the principles, norms, and rules that regulated their 
mutual interactions as a world among other worlds (Arrighi and Silver 
1999:287). 
 
Chaos and Governance never makes clear what East Asia’s shared principles, norms, and rules 
exactly are, nor how they survived a century of “destabilization”. Instead, Arrighi and Silver 
conclude with the vague proposition that “the leading states of the West are prisoners of the 
developmental paths that have made their fortunes, both political and economic” and that “East 
Asia must open up a new path of development for [itself] and the world that departs radically 
from the one that is now at a dead end.” (Arrighi and Silver 1999:288-289) Adam Smith rephrases 
the same propositions in a more sophisticated manner, making use of Adam Smith’s proposition 
on the natural and unnatural paths of development. Whereas Chaos and Governance posited that 
the subordinate incorporation of the China-centered world-system did not destroy the pre-existing 
Sino-centric system of international relations, Adam Smith additionally argues that this survival of 
the Sino-centric system “contributed to the ongoing transformation of the incorporating Western 
system itself” (Arrighi 2007a:313). In conclusion, it is clear that Arrighi considerably modified 
the original idea of China’s “subordination to the Western commands” that was presented in The 
Long Twentieth Century. Instead he has come to favor “hybridization” between the two distinct 
paths of developments, one capitalist and one not. And within this hybrid construct he stresses the 
resilience of the market-logic that prevailed in China in particular (despite the active distortion of 
market forces up until 1979 and the active promotion of profit-seeking after 1979). 
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THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
The analytical reconstruction of The Long Twentieth Century is motivated by Arrighi’s present 
political concerns. Especially the resilience of the market-logic, still prevailing in East Asia 
despite a century of convergence with the “unnatural” capitalist path, serves as a crucial 
precondition for Arrighi’s hope for a future market-based commonwealth that is no longer 
dominated by the endless accumulation of capital. The future will of course show whether 
Arrighi’s utopistics holds any validity or if, East Asia’s economic growth (when, or if, continued) 
will bring little systemic change about.5
 
 But already within the analytical architecture of Adam 
Smith, the connection between its historical narrative and contemporary examination is, to use the 
expression by Abu-Lughod, “provocative but filled with hypothetical conjectures and unproven 
reasoning” (Abu-Lughod 2009). Even if one agrees that a shift in the epicentre of the global 
political economy is taking place from North America to East Asia, few people interpret this shift 
as the end of capitalism as we know it, despite the different economic trajectory the region might 
have walked down in the past (for a discussion see Abbeloos 2008; Clark 2008; Coyne 2009; 
Dyer 2007; Gulick 2009; Trichur and Sherman 2009; Walden 2007). There are few signs that 
China’s recent economic development challenges a capitalist logic of power and accumulation. 
Joel Andreas agrees that the economy was indeed non-capitalist in the distant and recent past, 
both in the Marxist sense as a mode of production and in the Braudelian sense as a mode of rule 
and accumulation, but argues that because of “the radical reforms carried out in recent years, the 
non-capitalist market economy that existed in the 1980s has been transformed into a capitalist 
economy: 
There is no longer a socialist sector and virtually all enterprises that employ more 
than a handful of people, whether they are publicly or privately owned, now 
operate according to capitalist principles. […] a distinctive characteristic of the 
present-day Chinese system is the extent to which capital is organized around the 
state apparatus, an intricate web in which influence runs in both directions. […] 
as things stand, this development would refashion rather than transcend the 
existing capitalist order (Andreas 2008:133,139,141). 
 
A new type of “political exchange” within China between governmental and business agencies 
does not seem to be one in which the former can still keep the latter in check. Or put in a more 
Marxist fashion, Arrighi admits that it is difficult to assess “whether the Chinese government is in 
the process of becoming a committee for managing the common affairs of its national 
bourgeoisie.” (Arrighi 2007a:359) Concerning its role in world politics, China seems to look 
beyond its borders for much the same reasons rising powers have done so in the past. China is 
hungry for Latin American, and especially African, natural resources (such as copper) to fuel its 
rapidly growing economy. It is true that African political leaders themselves do not always look 
at China as the new imperial power on the block, but sometimes welcome its investments as a 
                                                 
5 As is clear from Adam Smith, Arrighi never seriously considers the possibility that an Eastern shift in the 
epicentre of the global political economy might simply ignite another cycle of accumulation. When David 
Harvey in an interview confronted Arrighi with this possibility, his answer is, as Bair noted, “somewhat 
elusive”. (Bair 2009:225; for the interview see Arrighi 2009). 
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wave of South-South cooperation that is not subject to the same conditional ties which 
characterize Western investments (Sautman and Hairong 2007). On the other hand, this suggested 
Beijing consensus and its emphasis on national sovereignty and multilateralism may be little more 
than a pretext to do business with both democratic and authoritarian regimes, serving as a 
legitimization of the type of hands off policy China has applied to the human rights crisis in 
Sudan. Looking back half a century, this Beijing consensus and its positive acceptance in 
peripheral countries seems to resemble both the message and acceptance of the United States’ 
“right to self-determination” after the Second World War:  
 
The United States was thus able to pose during the Second World War as the 
natural ally of the emergent nationalism in the colonial empires, and as the 
guarantor of the promises of self-determination and national independence […], 
the model of the ‘Revolution of 1776’ was not merely an American propaganda 
weapon for use in the colonial world, but also a spontaneous source of inspiration 
for the colonial peoples themselves. […] Towards the end of the 1940’s, 
however, the nationalist tendencies of the colonial world began to diverge from 
the expansionist tendencies of the United States (Arrighi 1978:93-94).  
 
Analogous to the American example of the mid-twentieth century, a Chinese hands off policy is 
easy to uphold as long as the African countries are in no position to push for a number of 
developmental obligations that conflict with the expansionist tendencies of the Chinese economy. 
It remains to be seen what Beijing will do once African states will seek to drive up the bargain in 
meeting the Chinese demand for resources (for an in depth discussion see Alden 2007).  
To conclude, Arrighi knows he is making uncertain projections into an uncertain future. 
Adam Smith for example ends with the warning that, “by relying too heavily on the energy-
consuming Western path, China’s rapid economic growth has not yet opened up for itself and the 
world an ecologically sustainable developmental path” (Arrighi 2007a:398). The political 
message of Adam Smith in Beijing holds that the future of the world will not be determined by the 
Euro-American powers, and that this future might be bright if China and other Southern states 
reorient their policies towards a path of balanced development, socially and ecologically. 
Straightforward as it may be, it feels a bit uncomfortable to see an ambitious book that practically 
suffers from too much sophisticated theoretical reflections end in such a circumspect conclusion. 
Or put in another way, if Arrighi’s model of The Great Divergence and Convergence proves to be 
a hard template to understand the place of China within an integrating global economy, the model 
gives even less guidance to understand the prospects of this global economy.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT REMAINS OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-SYSTEM? 
 
Adam Smith in Beijing is an attempt to answer the question that Arrighi left hanging at the end of 
The Long Twentieth Century: “Can capitalism survive success?” We may now rephrase the 
question: “What remains of the capitalist world-system?” The question runs in two directions, 
past and present. First, Arrighi hopes that at present, the capitalist world-system might give way 
to Adam Smith’s commonwealth of civilizations (Arrighi 2007a:10). Regarding these utopistics, 
we emphasize that Arrighi knows he makes uncertain projections into an uncertain future. 
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Second, and more fundamental to world-systems analysis, these projections are based on, or 
rather motivate, a model of the Great Divergence and Convergence that aims to supplement The 
Long Twentieth Century but creates new ambiguities in doing so. Given that the aim of world-
systems analysis, in the words of Wallerstein,  is about offering “more plausible explanations of 
historical reality” (2007:19), Arrighi’s conceptual struggles with capitalism and the world-
economic unit do not seem to lead to a better understanding of the Gordian knot of World 
History. We agree with Christopher Chase-Dunn that Arrighi “does far better than Frank” in 
seeing that until deep in the nineteenth century East Asia and Europe threaded down different 
developmental paths, and that there was a substantially independent East Asian international 
system prior to the nineteenth century (Chase-Dunn 2009). However, the real problem is 
Arrighi’s assumption that Asia’s market-oriented legacy survived within a European, and later, a 
North American, political-military interaction network. Characterized as a process of 
subordination, formal dissolution or hybridization, it is difficult to understand the place of China 
and East Asia within the world during the long 20th century. Adam Smith presents an impressive 
historical analysis to remind us that world history is not a teleological march towards Fukuyama’s 
End of History (1993), but this does not automatically render Arrighi’s speculations on the “End 
of Capitalism” more credible. East Asia may not have had an inherent tendency to generate the 
capital- and energy-intensive developmental path opened up by Britain, but one could argue that 
it is emulating this path today to the full extent.  
 In sum, what stimulated much of Arrighi’s research but finally turned against him is his 
“presentist” approach to historical sociology (Moore 1997:105). Ever since The Geometry of 
Imperialism (1978), Arrighi’s main concern lay with the future directions of the world economy 
and how to understand the economic downturn of/since the seventies. Moore stresses that this 
attitude allowed Arrighi to discern long-run cycles with tremendous clarity but made him 
vulnerable to the very problem World-Systems Analysis aims to remedy: an ahistorical analysis 
of the evolution of capitalism. The problem with Adam Smith is not so much that the analysis 
once more risks to ahistorical argument, but that this time around, the analysis has lost some of its 
tremendous clarity. Instead of fine tuning the rigorous model Arrighi presented in The Long 
Twentieth Century, we are offered a supplement that does fairly little to cut The Gordian knot of 
the Great Divergence and Convergence. Nor does Adam Smith address other problems with The 
Long Twentieth Century such as its underestimation of technological factors in the study of the 
global economy (Elvin 2008:92-93). Despite these problems, The Long Twentieth Century’s 
analysis of “long centuries” of converging and diverging relationships between the production of 
wealth, power and space in the history of capitalism stands as one of the most stimulating in the 
historical sociological literature. It deserves to be criticized, updated and tested, but “unthinking” 
it in the light of an East Asian development with an unclear outcome seems a big risk to take – 
and it might not be the most promising option to understand much of this development itself. 
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